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Residents both enjoy the policies adopted in their cities, and choose
those policies. If some people can better evaluate policies than can
others, then the most perceptive people will be the most willing to
move to the city with better policies, thereby making that city more
likely to adopt good policies in the future. Such migration can cause
agglomeration, with some cities prospering and others failing.
11 Introduction
Some cities grow and prosper; others shrink. Some regions see increasing
concentrations of high-technology industries; other regions see their indus-
tries ﬂee. Common explanations for diﬀerent fortunes of cities are diﬀerences
in geographical features, economies of agglomeration, and related network ef-
fects. In this paper we focus on a fourth explanation, the adoption of diﬀerent
policies by governments in diﬀerent regions: some are good, while some are
bad. We diﬀer from other work in two ways. First, we allow policies to
diﬀer in quality not for exogenous reasons, but because residents and voters
diﬀer in their ability to evaluate policies and to identify good candidates or
policies. Second, we allow for migration of voters, with the most perceptive
people the most willing to move to regions or cities which will likely adopt
good policies. This migration, aﬀecting the composition of voters, can in
turn aﬀect the policies adopted in each city. The combination of these two
eﬀects can lead to snowball eﬀects—once a city adopts good policies which
encourage growth, it becomes increasingly likely to adopt good policies.
To elaborate, consider two cities, each with an incumbent mayor. One
mayor is better than the other, say in building infrastructure more eﬃciently,
choosing better infrastructure projects, and so on. Perceptive residents of one
city may move to the city with the better policy. They do so for two reasons.
First, they want to beneﬁt from the better policy. Second, they want to live
in the city which will choose better policies in the future. In the next period,
or in the next election, the city with the larger proportion of perceptive voters
will also choose a better mayor. Therefore, in the next period, the city which
increased its fraction of perceptive voters will do even better. We may then
have net migration to one city over another, leading to continued growth.
This may look like economies of agglomeration, but is not.
Historical examples of people migrating for political reasons are common.
The Pilgrims left England for the United States to escape religious persecu-
tion. During the American Revolutionary War, loyalists migrated to Canada,
changing the political complexions of both Canada and of the United States.
Some of these migrations arise because a minority has diﬀerent policy pref-
erences from the majority. But migration can also arise from diﬀerences in
beliefs about the quality of policy.
Recent work stresses the importance of a city’s composition. In partic-
ular, Florida (2002, 2005) argues that the success of local economies de-
2pends largely on the presence of a “creative class,” and that to develop their
economies cities must adopt policies that attract such people. Some leaders
have reacted accordingly. The city of Providence, Rhode Island is so worried
that it appeals little to hip, young, technology workers that local economic-
development oﬃcials are urging a campaign to make the city the nation’s
capital of independent rock music. Pittsburgh oﬃcials want to build bike
paths and outdoor hiking trails to make the city a magnet for creative work-
ers. A Memphis economic-development group is pressing for “celebrations of
diversity” to attract more gays and minorities.1 These analyses do not rec-
ognize, however, that a city is more likely to know how to attract members
of the creative class the greater the number of its residents who themselves
belong to the creative class. Our analysis allows for consideration of such
eﬀects.
2 Literature
2.1 Agglomeration in cities
Since a central feature of cities is agglomeration, a large literature examines
its beneﬁts, both in consumption and in production. When economies of
scale in production limit the number of varieties of a good produced, an
increase in the number of consumers who prefer some class of goods can
generate a consumption externality.2 People who want to consume a wide
variety of goods may therefore prefer living in large cities. This cause of
agglomeration has been analyzed theoretically and veriﬁed empirically.3 The
taste for diversity can generate economic growth in a city and the formation of
a large city (see de Groot and Nahuis (1998) and Ogawa (1998) for theoretical
analyses). Such agglomeration, as Tabuchi (1998) shows through numerical
simulations of a general equilibrium model, can improve welfare. The desire
1See Steven Malanga “The Curse
of the Creative Class: A New Age theory of urban development amounts to economic
snake oil.” http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110004573.
2For nice evidence on this eﬀect, see George and Waldfogel (2000), who ﬁnd that per
capita readership of newspapers by whites increases with the number of whites in a market,
and that readership by blacks increases with the number of blacks in a market.
3For a survey of theoretical and empirical work on urban agglomeration, see Quigley
(1998).
3by consumers to avoid excessive transportation costs when buying a wide
variety of goods can also aﬀect the spatial structure within a city (Stahl
(1983), Fujita (1988), and Rivera-Batiz (1988)).
2.2 Migration
Understanding agglomeration requires understanding migration—under what
conditions will people move to a larger city. Any discussion of migration of
course builds on the classic analysis by Tiebout (1956), who argues that peo-
ple will move to communities consisting of people similar to themselves, and
so who prefer the same types and quantities of local public goods. This eﬀect
can limit the size of cities: the greater variety of private goods in a large city
may be counteracted by the smaller variety of local public goods when much
of the population lives in a few large cities.
The incentives of politicians to induce migration are studied by Glaeser
and Shleifer (2002). They discuss Mayor Curley of Boston, who used waste-
ful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to
encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the elec-
torate in his favor. Curley won elections, but Boston stagnated.
Relatedly, Hansen and Kessler (2001) study how mobility and taxation
interact. Their model explains why tax rates are lower in small countries
than in large ones. People diﬀer in their incomes, and migration arises from
self-selection. In their model, the political equilibrium has rich people voting
for low taxes and low grants; poor people vote for high taxes and high grants.
The Curley eﬀect, and the eﬀects of taxes on migration, however, can be
weak when land prices reﬂect local policies. The eﬀects of taxes on property
values and on migration are studied by Epple and Romer (1991). They
show that though local redistribution induces sorting of the population, the
induced changes in property values make redistribution feasible.
2.3 Quality of politicians
The studies referred to suppose that people have heterogeneous preferences—
rich people prefer to live where other rich people do. Migration and agglom-
eration can also occur when preferences are homogeneous, but information is
not. In particular, some voters may know more about the quality of politi-
cians in diﬀerent cities.
4The quality of politicians is studied by Carrillo and Mariotti (2001) and
Caselli and Morelli (2001). They focus on the incentives of politicians, but
do not consider the ability of voters to evaluate politicians or policies. Besley
and Coate (1997, 1998) argue that low-quality candidates can be elected if
those voters who share their preferences cannot concentrate their votes on a
higher-quality candidate, either because of coordination failures (band-wagon
eﬀect), or because preferences and ability are perfectly correlated.
The snowball eﬀects we shall consider will be strengthened if the civic
culture in a city reﬂects the identity of its past residents: the higher the
quality of past residents, the better its procedures and traditions, and so the
more successful it will be in the future. This relates to work on corporate
cultures.4
3 Assumptions
We consider two jurisdictions (or cities), A and B, indexed by j. Each person
lives for two years; a person is young in year 1 of his life, and old in year 2
of his life; generations overlap. We divide each year into two sub-periods. A
person is born in the ﬁrst half of a year; in that half year he votes (as do the
elderly) on a policy in his city. The policy can be either good or bad. The
results of the policy are realized in the second half of each year. A resident
in a city prefers a good policy over a bad policy. A good policy adopted in
the ﬁrst half of a year generates positive beneﬁts G to each of its residents in
the second half of that year; a bad policy generates zero beneﬁts. At a ﬁxed
cost of c a young person can move between the time he votes and the time
the policy is realized. An old person votes in the ﬁrst half of his second year,
cannot move after voting, and realizes the beneﬁts of the policy in the second
half of his second year. A resident can be either perceptive (an H-type) or
not (an L-type); the type is ﬁxed over a person’s life. An H-type person
diﬀers from an L-type person in two ways. First, as described below, a city
likely adopts a good policy the greater the fraction of the residents who are
4Snowball eﬀects arising from culture have been studied in corporations. If corporate
culture is embodied in the ﬁrm’s workers (Jovanovic (1979) and Prescott and Visscher
(1980),suppose), then as Arrow (1974) shows, a ﬁrm’s culture can be path dependent, and
culture can vary across ﬁrms.
5H-types.5 More speciﬁcally, let the ratio of H-types to L-types in city j in
year t be x
j
t. Then the city adopts a good policy with probability f(x
j
t),
where f0 > 0. An uninformed resident’s estimates as f(x
j
t) the probability
that the city adopted a good policy.
Second, an H-type is more likely than is an L-type to know whether
a city has a good or a bad policy. More speciﬁcally, with probability πH
an H-type knows the quality of the policy adopted by both cities in the
current period; with probability πL < πH an L-type resident has such perfect
information. With probability 1 − πH an H-type has no direct information
about the quality of policy adopted in that period. He does, however, know
the fraction of residents in each city who are H-types. An L-type person also
knows this fraction.
A young person moves from one city to another if that would increase his
expected future utility. Of course, a person’s beneﬁt from moving is higher
if the other city has a better policy, or is expected to adopt a better policy
in the future.
The beneﬁts arising in the following year are discounted by δ. The utility
of a person living in city k in the ﬁrst half of year t and who does not move is
E(f(xk
t))G+δE(f(xk
t+1))G. The utility of a person living in city k in the ﬁrst





person can achieve higher utility if he knows the quality of policies adopted
in the two cities in year t+1. If he does not know, his utility is as described
above. In contrast, if he does know the policy in the other city, then in the




To simplify the analysis and to highlight the eﬀects of migration, we want
births and deaths to leave the composition of a city unchanged. We therefore
assume that a new-born inherits the type of a random old person in that city.6
Many of the assumptions are depicted in Figure 1, which shows residents in
the two cities, migration decisions, and policy choices.
5The relation may occur because of voting (with H-types more likely to vote for a good
oﬃcial or for a good policy), because H-types residents can lobby government for good
policies, because H-types residents can provide useful information to policymakers, and so
on.
6A more general assumption would have inheritance reﬂect a weighted average of the
characteristics of the previous two generations. The snowball eﬀect we analyze below
would then be strengthened.
64 Migration
We begin our analysis by determining the utility-maximizing behavior of an
individual—whether to migrate from one city to another. An individual’s
decision depends on his expectations of future policy in each city. But since
policy depends on the composition of a city’s residents, an individual’s expec-
tations about policy depend on his expectations about migration by other
individuals. That requires considering equilibrium behavior, which we do
later.
4.1 An individual’s decision
In considering an individual’s decision, three cases must be examined: city A
has the better policy, city B has the better policy, or the two cities have the
same policy. For simplicity, we assume that πL is zero and denote πH simply
as π; that is, 0 = πL < πH = π. We suppose, without loss of generality,
that xA
t is at least as large as xB
t . Suppose for the moment that each person
expects no uninformed H-type to move.
4.1.1 Migration by an L-type
Recall that a fraction π of H-types know that city A has the better policy,
that a fraction 1−π of H-types do not, and that no L-type knows which city
has the better policy. Recall also that f(x
j
t+1), the probability that policy
will be good in city j in period t+1, depends on migration in period t, which
in turn depends on the policies in the cities. Also recall that an L-type does
not know which city has the better policy, and so is unsure about migration
by H-types. He does form expectations, with E(f(x
j
t+1)) his estimate of the
probability that city j will have a good policy in period t + 1. Call lt the
number of L-types who move from city B to city A in year t (with the move












If each person believes that an informed H-type moves to the city with
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If each person believes that an informed H-type in city B will move to city
A when city A adopts a good policy and city B adopts a bad policy, whereas
an informed H-type in city A will stay when city A adopts a bad policy and

















































The condition under which an L-type in city A will stay in city A is
f(x
A
t )G + δE(f(x
A
t+1))G > −c + f(x
B
t )G + δE(f(x
B
t+1))G. (5)
An L-type in city B will stay there if
−c + f(x
A




t )G + δE(f(x
B
t+1))G (6)








t )G + δE(f(x
B
t+1))G. (7)
8If (6) holds with lt = 0, then from (1) and (2), or from (3) and (4), we can
see that E(f(xA
t+1)) > E(f(xB
t+1)), and thus that (5) necessarily holds. Also
when (7) holds, (5) necessarily holds. Thus, in any case, (5) holds. Therefore,
we can see that an L-type in the city with large xt will never move.
Whether an L-type in the city with smaller xt moves depends on the
diﬀerence in xt between the cities. If xA
t is not suﬃciently larger than xB
t ,
then (6) holds. Though an L-type in city B can expect better policy in city
A, he cannot expect the quality to be so high as to compensate for the cost
of moving. Only if the gap in xt is suﬃciently large to satisfy (7) will an
L-type in city B move to city A.
Note that the beliefs of an L-type about the behavior of H-types should
be consistent with the behavior of an informed H-types who expects lt to
satisfy (5)-(7) with E(f(x
j
t+1)) under that belief. Because, as will be seen
below, an informed H-type in city B will move to city A when city A adopts a
better policy, either a pair of (1) and (2) or a pair of (3) and (4) is necessarily
satisﬁed.
4.1.2 Migration by an H-type
With the behavior of L-types analyzed, we turn to the migration of H-types.
City A has better policy Suppose ﬁrst that in period t city A adopts
a good policy and city B adopts a bad policy. An informed H-type who
knows the qualities of policies can perfectly predict x
j
t+1 and thus f(x
j
t+1).
An informed H-type in the city with the better policy can enjoy the beneﬁts
of that policy by staying in that city, and will not move to the city with the
inferior policy. That is, it necessarily follows that
G + δf(x
A
t+1)G > −c + 0 + δf(x
B
t+1)G, (8)
and thus an informed H-type in city A has no incentive to move.
When city A has a better policy than city B, and has a higher value of
xt, any one informed H-type in city B will move to city A if
−c + G + δf(x
A
t+1)G > 0 + δf(x
B
t+1)G. (9)
From the discussion above, an H-type in city A will necessarily stay in
that city; the number of H-types in city A will not decline. Therefore, if lt,
9the ﬂow of L-types into city A, is suﬃciently small, in period t + 1 city A
will be increasingly likely to adopt a good policy. In this case, (9) can hold
and informed H-types in city B will move to city A.
When (6) holds and so lt = 0, equation (9) is satisﬁed. That is, if the
gap in x
j
t is not suﬃciently large to induce L-types in city B to move, city A
maintains its higher probability of adopting a good policy, and thus H-types
in city B will move to city A.
Also when (7) holds, (9) is satisﬁed: the number of L-types who move
from city B to city A cannot be so large as to change the rank order of x
j
t.
Therefore, we see that in any case (9) is satisﬁed and an informed H-
type in city B will necessarily move to city A. An informed H-type will be
attracted by both the higher utility realized in the current period, and by
the higher utility expected in the next period in city A.
City B has better policy Suppose next that city B has the better policy.
An informed H-type in city B has no incentive to move, whereas any one
informed H-type in city A has an incentive to move if
0 + δf(x
A














Note that the condition (10) is less stringent than (9). Migration from
city A to city B can be limited when people expect city B to have few H-types,
leading to bad policy in city B in the following year.
Cities have identical policies Lastly, in any one period, the two cities
may have the same policy, namely both have good policies or both have bad
policies.
Suppose ﬁrst that both cities adopted bad policies. Then one equilibrium
is for no one to move. But might some rational H-types move, say from city B
to city A? If some H-types did move, then in the following year city A would
have a larger fraction of H-types than would city B, and so in the year after
that city A would adopt a good policy with higher probability than would
city B. That makes it attractive for an H-type to move. But it also makes it
attractive for an L-type to move. Therefore, rational behavior cannot have
only H-types move. Either no residents move, or all residents from B move
to A; then none is made better oﬀ, but each incurs a moving cost. Indeed,
10an H-type would then prefer to remain in city B, for city B would have a
higher fraction of perceptive residents in year 2. Thus, rational expectations
imply that no one moves.
If both cities adopted good policies, then the analysis is the same as when
both adopted bad policies.
4.2 Equilibrium behavior
The migration patterns fall into four cases, depending on which of (1)-(10)
the xA
t and xB
t satisfy. As before, we call city A the one with the higher value
of xt. The four cases are:
• Case 1: Equation (6) holds with lt = 0, (9) holds, and (10) holds. If
cities adopt diﬀerent policies, then informed H-types in the city with
the bad policy move to the city with the good policy.
• Case 2: Equation (6) holds with lt = 0, condition (9) holds, and (10)
does not hold. Then an informed H-type in the city with a bad policy
moves to the city with the good policy only if that is city A.
• Case 3: Equation (6) does not hold, (9) holds, and (10) holds. Some
L-types in city B move to city A up to the point where (7) holds. An
informed H-type in the city with the bad policy would move to the city
with the good policy.
• Case 4: Equation (6) does not hold, (9) holds, and (10) does not hold.
Some L-types in city B move to city A up to the point where (7) holds.
An informed H-type in the city with a bad policy moves to the city
with the good policy only if that is city A.
Figure 2 shows the areas in which each of the four cases holds . The
horizontal axis measures the distribution of L-types between the cities. The
distance from the left is the number of L-types in city A; the distance from
the right is the number of L-types in city B. The vertical axis measures
the distribution of H-types between the cities. The distance from the origin
is the number of H-types in city A. Points above the 45 degree line show
distributions of residents in which city A has a higher proportion of H-types
than does city B. For any point Q in the ﬁgure, the slope of line OQ is xA
t .
11Curve HH shows combinations of xA
t and xB
t which make an H-type
indiﬀerent about moving from city A to city B when city B has a better
policy; it is derived from (10), with an equality replacing the inequality. In
the area above curve HH, no informed H-type in city A moves to city B,
even if city B adopts a better policy. The larger the migration cost c, the
less willing is an H-type in city A to move to city B, and thus the larger is
the area above HH.
Curve LL shows combinations of xA
t and xB
t which make an L-type in-
diﬀerent about moving moving from city B to city A; it is derived from (6)
when it has an equality. At any distribution above this curve, some L-types
will move from city A to city B. Recall, however, that the behavior of an
L-type depends on his expectations on what H-types will do, in particular
on whether an H-type will move from city A to city B when city B has the
better policy. That in turn means that we must separately consider behavior
when curve HH lies above curve LL) (so that an L-type may move to city
A even when he expects that H-types may move to city B), and when curve
HH lies below curve LL (so that an L-type who moves to city A expects
that no H-type will ever move to city B).
If the migration cost c is small, curve HH lies above curve LL, as in
Figure 2(a).7 In contrast, if c is large, curve LL lies above curve HH, as in
Figures 2(b) and (c). The diﬀerent areas in the ﬁgures depict the four cases
discussed above.
Case 1 The area below curves HH and LL shows case 1 (H-types move
to whichever city has the better policy). Since xA
t is not very large, the
expected quality of policy in city A is not suﬃciently large to compensate
for the migration costs. H-types, however, may move to the city with the
better policy, so that the distribution can move vertically up or vertically
down, but not horizontally. The further is the distribution point from the 45
degree line, the more it tends to depart from it: the larger is the gap in x
j
t
between cities, the greater is the relative probability that the city with the
larger xt will adopt the better policy. Therefore, the distribution point will
infrequently cross the 45 degree line once it departs from it, but it may stay
in the area of case 1 for long periods, moving up and down in it.
7As an extreme case, if c = 0 curve HH becomes the horizontal line at the top of the
box; curve LL coincides with the 450 lines.
12Case 2 Curve LL lies above curve HH, as in Figures 2(b) and 2(c). The
enclosed area then shows case 2.8 The gap in the expected policy quality in
the next period f(x
j
t+1)G is suﬃciently large for an informed H-type to stay
in the city with higher xt despite the other city having a better policy. The
gap in x
j
t is not, however, suﬃciently large to induce an L-type in the city
with smaller x
j
t to move. Thus, in the area of case 2, a change can never be
to the left or to the right; and a change can never be straight down. The only
change can be straight up. In distinction to the case with small migration
costs, no counterforce prevents the gap in x
j
t from expanding. When the city
with larger x
j
t adopts a good policy, it attracts H-types. But the city with
larger xt does not attract L-types, and so does not suﬀer from a decline in
the quality of its voters. In contrast, even if the city with smaller x
j
t happens
to adopt the better policy, it attracts no H-type. Therefore, the gap between
the x
j
t’s continues to grow.
Case 3 Curve HH lies above curve LL, as in Figure 2(a) . The area
enclosed by these curves shows case 3: (H-types move to the city with the
better policy, and some L-types move to city A). 9 H-types may move to
the city with the better policy, and L-types may move to the city with more
H-types. Thus, in the area of case 3, a change can be to any direction other
than to the left. The migration of L-types cannot reverse the rank order
of xj, but it can prevent the gap in xj from becoming tremendously large,
and thus can help the city with smaller xt maintain a positive probability
of adopting the better policy and of attracting H-types. Thus, from a point
in this area, the distribution point can then cross the 45 degree line, though
infrequently.
8In drawing LL, we calculate combinations of the numbers of L-types and H-types in
each city which bind (6) with lt = 0. Note that E(f(x
j
t+1)) in (6) is not (1) and (2) but
(3) and (4). In drawing HH, we calculate combinations of of the numbers of L-types and
H-types in each city which bind (10) with lt = 0. We must then check whether LL lies
above HH.
9In drawing HH, we must calculate the value of lt and Ht which simultaneously satisfy
(7) and (10) for a given Lt. Note that E(f(x
j
t+1)) in (7) is not (3) and (4), but instead (1)
and (2). In drawing LL, we calculate combinations of the numbers of L-types and H-types
in each city which bind (6) with lt = 0. Again, note that E(f(x
j
t+1)) in (7) is not (3) and
(4) but (1) and (2). Then we must check that such HH lies above LL.
13Case 4 The area above curves HH and LL shows case 4 (H-types and
L-types may move to city A but not to city B). In this area, xA
t is suﬃciently
large so that no one in city A will incur the migration cost c of moving to
city B, even if city B adopts a better policy. But H-types and L-types in
city B may move to city A, expecting city A’s better policy, and change
the distribution up and to the right.. Thus, in the long run, all H-types
agglomerate in city A, and more than half, but not all, of L-types reside
there.
4.2.1 Dynamics
The dynamics, or the time path of xA
t and of xB
t , are stochastic, depending on
the realization of policy in each of the two cities. But to give the ﬂavor of the
dynamics, we numerically simulate the paths. We shall separately consider
cities which are initially identical in the composition of their populations,
and cities which diﬀer.
4.2.2 Initially identical cities
Simulation results with initially identical cities are shown by the solid lines
with dots in Figures 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c). In Figures 2(b) and 2(c), the
distribution of residents steadily approaches the steady-state solutions; Fig-
ure 2(a) instead shows cycling. The vertical segment lying above the initial
distribution on the 45 degree line means that at ﬁrst only H-types move;
only after some time do L-types move, generating the horizontal segments in
the ﬁgures. When migration costs are low, as in Figure 2(a), the city which
initially has the better policy enjoys a persistent (but not permanent) advan-
tage of a high proportion of H-types, and so a high probability of adopting
the better policy. When migration costs are high, as in Figures 2(b) or 2(c),
the city with the initially better policy permanently enjoys a better policy.10
People migrate because a city which happens to adopt a better policy
attracts informed H-types from the other city. Thus, in the next period, the
city with more H-types is more likely to adopt a better policy in the next
10For these simulations, πH = 0.2, δ = 0.9, and G = 1. The migration cost, c, is 0.6 in
Figures 2(a) and 3(a); the migration cost is 0.75 in Figures 2(b), 2(c), 3(b), and 3(c). The
function giving the probability policy is good, f(x), is (0.1 + x)/(1 + x) in Figures 2(a),
2(b), 3(a), and 3(b). The function is f(x) = (0.4 + x)/(1 + x) in Figures 2(c) and 3(c).
14period, will attract yet more H-types, and so further increase the expected
quality of its policies. With positive probability, however, the city with the
smaller xt will adopt the better policy, and so with positive probability will
attract H-types. L-types migrate after H-types have. It also mitigates the
increased gap in xt between cities. When c is large, L-types migrate only
after H-types do. Such migration by L-types cannot, however, reduce the
gap in x
j
t to such an extent that the city with smaller x
j
t can attract H-types
even when it adopts the better policy.
We show typical simulation results in a diﬀerent way in ﬁgures 3(a)-
3(c). The horizontal axis measures time; the vertical axis measures xA
t , or
the ratio of H-types to L-types in city A. Figure 3(a) shows three diﬀerent
simulations, with the migration cost set to a high value. We see that for long
periods one city or the other has a higher proportion of H-types, but that
given suﬃcient time a city will lose its advantage to another city. In contrast,
when migration costs are large, one city eventually gains the advantage in
having more H-types, and maintains that advantage (see Figures 3(b) and
3(c)).
The analysis can be extended to consider multiple cities. An equilibrium
can then have conﬁgurations of cities. One conﬁguration has both H-types
and L-types. The other type has only L-types. The mixed cities need not
necessarily have the identical distributions of residents: one city may have
a larger fraction of H-types than another city, but the moving costs may be
suﬃciently high to prevent migration.
4.2.3 Initially diﬀerent cities
Consider next cities which initially diﬀer in the compositions of their popu-
lations. We shall see that an equilibrium can have all H-types live in city A,
some L-types in city A, and some L-types in city B. Denoting equilibrium
outcomes by e, we will show that xA
e > 0, and that xB
e = 0.
When xA
t > 0 and xB












t+1)) = f(0). (12)
With these equations and lt = 0, (6) can be written as
−c + f(x
A
t )G + δf(x
A
t )G ≤ f(0)G + δf(0)G. (13)
15Therefore, if an L-type believes that no informed H-type in city A will move
to city B even if city B has the better policy, and if (13) holds, no L-type
will move to city A. Let xA
MAX be the value of xA
t which satisﬁes equation






MAX)G = f(0)G + δf(0)G. (14)
Obviously, this xA
MAX is the maximum xA
t which satisﬁes (13). When c is
large, curve LL can intersect the line HA = 1, as in Figure 2(c). The value
of xA
MAX is the slope of the line from O to the intersection of HA = 1 and
curve LL. For the beliefs of L-types about the behavior of H-types to be
consistent, (10) should not be satisﬁed,
0 + δf(x
A
MAX)G > −c + G + δf(0)G. (15)
Combining these two yields the condition for an equilibrium as
c > (G/2)(1 + f(x
A
MAX) − f(0)). (16)
Any combination of xB
e = 0 and xA
e which satisﬁes xA
e ≤ xA
MAX can be an
equilibrium: no L-type will move from city B to city A and no H-type will
move from city A to city B even if city B has the better policy. Therefore, if
initially xB
t = 0 and xA
t ≤ xA
MAX, then no one migrates, and these x
j
t repeat
perpetually. If initially xB
t = 0 and xA
MAX < xA
t , some L-types move from
city B to city A. But no one will move from city A to city B, so that xA
t
decreases and approaches xA
MAX.
5 Industry eﬀects
We so far spoke of migration due solely to diﬀerences in public policy between
the cities. But similar eﬀects can appear with technology or other shocks.
Suppose city A enjoys a positive technology shock. H-types people better
realize it, and so move to A. The increased number of H-types in city A then
makes it more likely to adopt good policies, creating a snowball eﬀect.
And similar eﬀects can appear within industries, explaining industry
decline.11 H-type workers recognize that the industry will decline, oﬀering
few opportunities in the future. H-type workers therefore leave the industry.
The shortage of H-types then accelerates the decline of the industry.
11For a diﬀerent explanation, see Cassing and Hillman (1986).
166 Conclusion
The economics literature has long recognized that people will migrate to ju-
risdictions with policies they prefer. It has also recognized that the identity
of residents determines the policies cities will adopt. In other branches of
literature, for example in studies of education and in studies of job match-
ing in the labor market, economists also explore the equilibria which arise
when people diﬀer in ability. But we do not know of work which examines
equilibria when people diﬀer in their knowledge of what policies a govern-
ment pursues. We think that such an examination can explain interesting
phenomena. Migration coupled with endogenous policy can lead some cities
to grow while others decline, in a patten that may look like that which arises
from economies of agglomeration, but which has nothing to do with it.
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197 Notation
c Cost of moving
G Gain to a resident from a good policy
lt Number of L-types who move from city B to city A in period t
x
j
t Ratio of H-types to L-types in city j in period t
δ Intertemporal discount rate
πi Probability that a type-i person knows the quality of policy adopted
20